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Max Weber (1864-1920)
Weber (the W pronounced as if it were a V ) is considered one of the founding fathers of modern sociology. Born in Germany, Weber seems to have been at best ambivalent at the prospect of being given the status of sociologist. He was a prolific writer with a diversity of interests in religion, history and sociology. In this lecture we can only touch upon a few of those diverse interests. By way of an introduction to the work of Weber I will make mention of his thoughts on the appropriate sociological method as well as his insights into the dynamic relationship between religion and human culture. Weber's place in the `sociological imagination' is assured. Of all the so-called 'founding fathers' the present sociological 'school' of thought known as the Neo-weberians is testimony to his continuing influence on contemporary sociology. Weber is primarily known for his 'social action' approach to the study of human societies and cultures. Following the work of the German philosophers, Dilthey and Rickert, Weber sought to establish a sociological method which addresses: `...the observation and theoretical interpretation of the subjective "states of mind" of actors.' Weber was concerned with the creative abilities of human beings to construct their world and make it meaningful and orderly. In this sense human beings should be understood as `actors'. Weber recognised the uniqueness of human beings to construct and live in `culture'. He defined culture as: "..a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance." We have here a first clue as to Weber's thinking on the relationships between individuals and culture. Culture allowed individuals to 'confer meaning' and thereby 'organise' their social worlds. Individuals would have nothing but chaos without culture. Clearly the rules and norms of cultures would a central interest for Weber. In order to analyse `social action' Weber suggested we attend to two distinct types of analysis. On the one hand there is: 1. Direct observational analysis; whereby through direct observation the sociologist can observe behaviour and reach a basic level of understanding of the behaviour. Thus we can tell that someone is angry by the expression on their face. On the other hand there is: 2. Causal analysis; whereby the sociologist reaches a deeper understanding of the behaviour s/he is watching. For in this type of analysis the observer becomes an interpreter of the behaviour as well. S/he attempts to empathise with the social actors by reaching an understanding of the actors' motives and intentions. Thus here we would seek the motives behind, say, the anger on the face of the individual. Here the individual's motives and meanings would be considered as the independent variables in the causal analysis and the resulting behaviour as the dependent variables. This type of understanding is often described as the sociologist attempting to put themselves in the situation of the actor, or again as the sociologist `going native'. It is argued that the German word Verstehen (which Weber would have used) conveys the notion of 'going native' in a much stronger manner than any English word can. Thus empathy is said to be a word/idea which can only at best partly address all that is entailed in Verstehen. Empathy seems quite an adequate word to use. If one has doubts about it's sense then one could always use an emphatic intonation when one utters the word! With this emphasis on motives and intentions Weber suggests that sociology is concerned with `social action' and this includes: "..... all human behaviour in so far as the actor attaches a subjective meaning to it." In methodological terms Weber is suggesting that sociologists seek and explain the independent variables of motives and meaning. THE WORLD, HOWEVER, IS A COMPLEX PLACE! In attempting to explain social action Weber recognises the diversity and complexity of the social world. There must and indeed is a multitude of motives and meanings held by individuals. Weber suggests that the sociologist should use a conceptual device with which to reduce this complexity to manageable patterns of motives and meanings. The conceptual device that Weber invents is the Ideal Type Ideal types are best seen as abstractions of reality. They are a way of classifying aspects of reality by emphasising key features of the social phenomena one wishes to understand. I might suggest that an Ideal Type is constructed in the following manner:
The use of Ideal Types allows the sociologist to use a comparative method . That is the sociologist can compare and contrast different groups, cultures and societies so as to determine similarities and differences. Weber uses the Ideal Type to analyse social action and as a consequence cultural and societal forms of organisation. Weber suggested 4 ideal types of social action: (These will be discussed more fully at the Lecture. Fill in the gaps with your understanding of these types) 1. Affectual or emotional.
2. Traditional
3. Value-Rational
4. Instrumental-Rational It is with these `conceptual tools' that sociologists can arrive at a full understanding of human creativity and social construction of reality. Many commentators on the work of Weber have suggested that his work be described as a Methodological Individualism. This is because of his emphasis on the individual in society.
WEBER & RELIGION: THE PROPHET MOTIVE! Weber was concerned to demonstrate, contrary to Marx's thought, that culture was not reducible to the economic aspect of a society. Weber insisted that culture was to be considered as an autonomous value-sphere of any society. We might define such a value-sphere as; "..a distinct realm of activity which has its own inherent dignity and in which certain values, norms, obligations are inherent." (Brubaker:1983) Not only is this value-sphere of culture autonomous but, for Weber, it has the ability to construct forms of economic activity! For Weber, culture is seen as an agent in the production and maintenance of social relations. For whilst culture is based upon choice, value and action- and thus subjective and volatile - it produces real material effects. Clearly Weber is turning Marx on his head! We can, and will demonstrate this below with regard to Weber's `Protestant Ethic' thesis. But this thesis of Weber's is in fact only a part of a wider historical dynamic process suggested by Weber. This historical process is driven by an interaction between charismatic individuals and a (creeping?) process of rationalisation. Influenced by Nietzsche, the German philosopher, Weber was interested in the existence and distribution of charisma in society. Charismatic individuals were seen as the driving force behind social groups and collectives. Three points should be noted with regard to Weber's use of the concept of charisma. First that it is not every individual who can take on the role of the `charismatic' leader. Only exceptional individuals. Thus `charisma' produces status stratification. Secondly, charisma is not, for Weber, an innate or intrinsic quality of this individual. On the contrary, charisma is created and sustained by the loyalty and indeed devotion of the of others members of society. It is in this sense that we must understand charisma to be based upon a set of social relationships. Relationships of authority and legitimacy. Finally, charismatic authority arises in periods of social unrest and change and thus depends not only on the existence of this `exceptional' individual but a social context which produces large numbers of individuals who are `disenchanted' with the present social institutions. Charisma, is in Weber's view ` a great revolutionary force' for social change. Charismatic movements always seek to dismantle or overthrow existing/traditional forms of authority and power. Finally, Weber suggests charismatic authority as inherently unstable since it is usually based upon a `personality cult' of the leader. When the leader dies then the movement will `die' with him/her or ossify and institutionalise itself into what Weber refers to as `the charisma of office': bureaucracy! Look at Fig. 1, (at the bottom of page 2 of this document) which I have taken and adapted from Bryan Turner's book. To understand the historical process we will need to begin with the `magician' and move `clockwise' towards `secular man'. We begin with the earliest form of society. Hunter-gatherer societies which were organised on the basis of kinship and lived in collectives of clans or tribes. The belief-systems of these peoples were, says Weber, based upon magic. Thus the magician (or wizard/shaman/witch) is the first to appear chronologically in human history. S/he relies upon the power of magic which Weber defines conventionally as the belief that spirits reside in animate objects and potions. Magic, for Weber, is directed toward the immediate environment of the clan or tribe. Thus magic is a local form of belief. Each clan/tribe would possess its own, very particular and locally based culture which would be distinct to the cultures of other clans/tribes. The beliefs and knowledges of these peoples would be (practically) directed towards their immediate environment. Magic will be based upon the immediate, the particular and the personal. Weber suggests that the typical forms of social action in such a society are affectual, based upon emotions and traditional, based upon local knowledges of elders as well as magicians. Equally the power of the magician is a personal power. S/he is only as as `good' as their last `spell'! Human culture at this stage is local and specific to the tribe/clan. Social action at this time, insists Weber, is based primarily on emotional or affectual social action. These societies are in no way 'bureaucratic' or 'organisational'. As we move clockwise we are introduced to the prophet. We also move to societies which are now organised around social institutions such as the state. These societies are also more hierarchically organised into classes and social groups. The prophet is in part similar to the magician. They like the magician will base their claims to leadership on their own personal properties of charisma. Thus, for example, they will make claims of the type: `I am the chosen one' or `I am the son of god' . However, if we consider further that last example we can see an important distinction between the prophet and the magician. For whilst the magician's claim is centred around the local and the immediate environment of the clan or tribe, this is not the basis of the claim for the prophet. The prophet puts forward a `universal doctrine'. Such a doctrine is universal in the sense that, unlike the doctrine of magic, which is local and particular to a tribe/clan, the universal doctrine claims to speak to, and for all peoples. Notice that the claim 'I am the son of god' appeals to an abstraction; god. An abstraction is always general and global not particular and local. Such universal doctrines are the basis of the World Religions of Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. All such religions are World religions because they claim to speak and order the whole world. It is at this point in human history, says Weber, that the rationalisation of social and cultural life really begins. The dominant form of belief is now religion and not magic and this rationalisation involves: 1. The hope of salvation shifts from the immediate material world to a `world' yet to come: Heaven or Valhalla etc.. 2. The tension in each individual between how they want the world to be and how it actually is becomes heightened. Especially in terms of the inner-life, the soul, of individuals. 3. A system of morality. How to act towards nature and towards other human beings. For example: `The Ten Commandments'. Each religion devises a system of Ethics. Thus religions produce value-orientations for the culture and society. Weber never understates the power of the prophet. Not only has the prophet the necessary charisma but s/he uses this to `rationalise' the world. But it is the charisma that acts as: `..the great revolutionary force.' In terms of his `types' of social action. Religion utilises and advances the third value-rational form. Here the action is motivated by a higher ideal such as god. But the prophets' intentions and motives are thwarted!
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